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This Essay describes and defends the Supreme Court’s role as a
filter between international law and the American constitutional
system. In this role, the Court ensures that when international law
passes into the U.S. legal system, it does so in a manner consistent
with domestic constitutional values. This filtering role is appropriate,
the Essay explains, in light of the different processes used to generate
international law and domestic law and the different functions served
by these bodies of law. The Essay provides examples of this filtering
role in four scenarios: the intersection of treaties and individual
rights; the relationship between the treaty power and American
federalism; delegations of authority to international institutions; and
the domestic application of customary international law.
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INTRODUCTION
In his informative and timely book, Justice Breyer repeatedly emphasizes
that the Supreme Court is a domestic court, not an international tribunal, and
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that there is no Supreme Court for the world.1 Against that backdrop, Justice
Breyer suggests various functions that the Supreme Court can perform as it
faces an increasingly international docket, such as promoting harmonization,
fostering collaboration, and helping to promote the rule of law. I do not
disagree that the Supreme Court can play these roles in appropriate cases. In
this Essay, I will describe another important role that the Supreme Court does
and should serve, which is to act as a filter between international law and the
American constitutional system. Although not Justice Breyer’s focus, this
filtering role is illustrated by a number of the cases that he discusses in his
book.
By filter, I do not mean that the Court is or should be some sort of
impermeable barrier to international law. Rather, the idea is that the Court
should ensure that when international law passes into the U.S. legal system, it
does so in a manner consistent with domestic constitutional values. Although
this filtering process might in some instances dilute or narrow international law
as it is applied within the United States, this is not inevitably the result. Filters
can operate to improve and refine something for a particular purpose—think of
a filter for coffee, for example—and this is often what happens when U.S.
courts attempt to tailor international law to the U.S. domestic system.
This filtering role is needed because international law is generated
through processes that often make it ill-suited for direct application in the U.S.
legal system, and because it is frequently designed to perform functions
different from those demanded of domestic law. The two principal sources of
international law are customary international law and treaties. Customary
international law arises out of the evolving practices and beliefs of nations.2
Although the United States contributes to its formation and change, this body
of law does not require any specific approval process in the United States.
Moreover, because customary international law is unwritten and evolving, its
content is often uncertain and contested. Indeed, even the types of evidence that
should count toward ascertaining its content are the subjects of substantial
dispute.3 Because of its contested and evolutionary character, determinations of
the content of customary international law implicate not only legal
considerations but also considerations of U.S. foreign policy.4

1. See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES 6, 149, 236 (2015).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987) (explaining that customary international law “results from a general and consistent
practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation”).
3. For discussion of some of the debates and uncertainties surrounding custom as a source of
international law, see CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD (Curtis A.
Bradley ed., 2016).
4. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432–33 (1964) (“When
articulating principles of international law in its relations with other states, the Executive Branch
speaks not only as an interpreter of generally accepted and traditional rules, as would the courts, but
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Treaties, by contrast, do engage directly with U.S. constitutional
processes, in that they require the agreement of the President and two-thirds of
the Senate. Nevertheless, treaties are frequently vague because they are
negotiated with representatives of a variety of legal and political systems and
often have to be finessed to generate agreement among the parties. Even when
treaties are precise, they often use terminology that differs from comparable
concepts in U.S. law. The executive branch also dominates U.S. involvement in
the treaty negotiation process, with the Senate serving only as an approval body
after the text of the treaty has been set. Legislative involvement is therefore
lower than for domestic statutes.5
Another component of international law today is the output of
international institutions. Operating under delegations of authority in treaties,
many modern international institutions have the power to adjudicate disputes
and issue binding rulings. These institutions also often have the power to fill in
the gaps of treaties or update them, without the requirement of new treaty
ratifications. The growth of this international regulatory authority resembles in
some ways the rise of the administrative state in the United States, but without
the same level of domestic oversight. There is no Administrative Procedure Act
for international institutions, and there is often no centralized judicial review.
Because only executive agents represent the United States in these international
institutions, the executive branch—rather than the legislature—dominates U.S.
involvement in international regulatory output even more than it dominates the
treaty negotiation and ratification process.6
In describing the Supreme Court as a filter, I should make clear that it is
not the only filter in the United States, or even the primary one. Other
government institutions also operate as filters, and sometimes the most
important action that the courts take is to facilitate the filtering actions of other
institutions. For example, the Senate often includes reservations and other
conditions with its advice and consent to treaties to address constitutional and
policy concerns. To take a relatively uncontroversial example, the Senate has

also as an advocate of standards it believes desirable for the community of nations and protective of
national concerns.”).
5. The vast majority of international agreements concluded by the United States since the
1930s have not even gone through the senatorial advice and consent process and instead have been
concluded as some form of “executive agreement.” CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 76 (2d ed. 2015). Although executive agreements concluded with the ex ante
or ex post approval of Congress—so called “congressional-executive agreements”—arguably involve
more democratic involvement than treaties because they are supported by both houses of Congress
rather than just the Senate, the negotiation process is still dominated by the executive branch. See Oona
A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United
States, 117 YALE L. J. 1236, 1308 (2008).
6. See BRADLEY, supra note 5, at 102. Congress does, however, sometimes attempt to
influence executive branch participation in international organizations. See, e.g., Kristina Daugirdas,
Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 517 (2013).
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attached reservations to some human rights treaties making clear that the
United States is not agreeing to criminalize hate speech.7 Free speech
protections are stronger in the United States than in some other countries, so
this reservation helped avoid a potential conflict between the Constitution and
U.S. treaty commitments.
Using some of the cases that are discussed in Justice Breyer’s book, I will
give examples of the Supreme Court’s filtering role in four scenarios: (1) the
intersection of treaties and individual constitutional rights; (2) the relationship
between the treaty power and American federalism; (3) delegations of authority
to international institutions; and (4) the domestic application of customary
international law.
I.
TREATIES AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The filtering role in the first scenario—the intersection of treaties and
individual rights—is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s 1957 decision in Reid
v. Covert.8 In that case, two wives of U.S. servicemembers stationed abroad
were being tried for murdering their husbands—one in England and the other in
Japan. The issue was whether the wives could be tried in U.S. military courts,
even though they were civilians. The Uniform Code of Military Justice allowed
military trials of persons living with servicemembers stationed abroad as long
as such trials would be consistent with any international agreements to which
the United States was a party. The United States had agreements with England
and Japan allowing for such trials. Initially, the Supreme Court concluded that
this arrangement was constitutional, but it then took the unusual step of
granting rehearing, and in its second decision it held that the arrangement
violated the jury trial provisions of the Constitution. A plurality of the Court
explained that “[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution”
and “[i]ts power and authority have no other source.”9 As for the agreements
with England and Japan, the plurality stated that “no agreement with a foreign
nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of
Government, which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.”10
The Supreme Court later confirmed this proposition in a case concerning
free speech rights, Boos v. Barry.11 At issue there was the constitutionality of a

7. See, e.g., U.S. Reservations, Declarations, and Understandings, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. 8070 (Apr. 2, 1992) (including a reservation stating that
Article 20 of the Covenant, which provides that any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence shall be prohibited by law, “does not
authorize or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the right of free
speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States”).
8. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
9. Id. at 5–6.
10. Id. at 16.
11. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
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District of Columbia statute that prohibited the display of any sign within five
hundred feet of a foreign embassy if that sign tended to bring that foreign
government into “public odium” or “public disrepute.” In concluding that this
statute violated the First Amendment right of free speech, the Court rejected
the argument that the statute was a proper implementation of a U.S. treaty
obligation to protect the peace of embassies. The Court quoted the plurality
opinion in Reid for the proposition that an international agreement cannot
confer power on the government that is free from the restraints of the
Constitution.12 The Court also held that “the fact that an interest is recognized
in international law does not automatically render that interest ‘compelling’ for
purposes of First Amendment analysis.”13
II.
THE TREATY POWER AND AMERICAN FEDERALISM
The Court’s filtering role in the second scenario—the relationship
between the treaty power and American federalism—is illustrated by the
Court’s 2014 decision in Bond v. United States.14 That case concerned criminal
legislation that implemented the Chemical Weapons Convention, a treaty that
the United States joined in 1997. This legislation—the Chemical Weapons
Convention Implementation Act (the Act)—purported to criminalize all nonpeaceful uses of “chemical weapons,” which the Act broadly defined to include
“any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”15
The issue in Bond was whether the Act applied to the attempt by a woman in
Pennsylvania to use toxic chemicals to poison another woman in Pennsylvania
as part of a domestic dispute.
In concluding that the statute should not be interpreted to apply to this
situation, the Court explained that a literal interpretation of the statute would
have significant implications for the American federal system of government.16
The federal system, the Court emphasized, allocates much of the responsibility
for criminal law and enforcement, including local poisoning cases, to the state
rather than national level.17 The Court also noted that, in cases involving
domestic statutes, it had generally declined to read federal law as intruding on
the traditional responsibility of the states “unless Congress ha[d] clearly
indicated that the law should have such reach.”18 Applying the same approach
here, the Court said that it would “insist on a clear indication that Congress

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 324.
Id.
134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
18 U.S.C. §§ 229(a), 229F(1)(A), 229F(8)(A) (2012).
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091–92.
Id. at 2092–93.
Id. at 2083.
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meant to reach purely local crimes, before interpreting the statute’s expansive
language in a way that intrudes on the police power of the States.”19 The Court
found no such clear indication.
Bond was a case in which Congress did a poor job of exercising its own
filtering role. For reasons of democratic self-governance and sufficient notice
to criminal defendants, it has long been assumed that criminal liability in the
United States cannot be premised directly on a treaty.20 Instead, when a treaty
calls for criminalization, Congress must pass implementing legislation defining
the offense and specifying the penalty. The Chemical Weapons Convention
expressly recognized that this implementing legislation may be necessary when
it stated that “[e]ach State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional
processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this
Convention.”21 Congress, however, essentially photocopied the treaty into the
U.S. Code.22 The result created tension not only with principles of American
federalism, but also with individual liberty, since it would not have been
apparent to potential criminal defendants that an international regime designed
to address situations like Syria’s use of chemical weapons (and the severe
penalties that Congress imposed in connection with this regime) would apply to
local crimes within the United States.23 The Court’s application of a “clear
indication” requirement helped ensure that these values would actually be
considered in the political process, and it also allowed the Court to avoid
having to address, at least for now, how far that process could go with respect
to intrusions on federalism.
III.
DELEGATIONS OF AUTHORITY TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The Court’s filtering role in the third scenario—delegations of authority to
international institutions—is illustrated by the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision
in Medellin v. Texas.24 This case resembles a law professor’s imaginative
hypothetical, with enough moving parts to make your head spin. In 1945, the
United States ratified the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter). Article
94 of the UN Charter provides that “[e]ach Member of the United Nations
undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in
19. Id. at 2090.
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111, cmt. i (1987).
21. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. VII(1), Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800, 810.
22. See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085 (noting that the Act “closely tracks the text of the treaty”).
23. In an earlier decision in the Bond case, in which the Supreme Court held that the defendant
had standing to raise the federalism argument, the Court noted that there is a connection between
federalism and individual liberty. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“By
denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism
protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.”).
24. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
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any case to which it is a party.”25 During the next several decades, the United
States agreed in various treaties to submit disputes under the treaties to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). In 1969, for example, the United States
ratified the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna Convention),
which among other things, requires that when the United States arrests
nationals from other party countries, it must notify them that they have the right
to have their consulate notified of the arrest and to communicate with the
consulate.26 At the same time, the United States also ratified an Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention providing that disputes between countries
under the Convention could be heard in the ICJ.27
For many years, the United States often failed to provide the consular
notice required under the Vienna Convention, especially for arrests made at the
state and local levels. For one thing, many police departments were simply
unaware of the obligation.28 Eventually, advocates of foreign-citizen prisoners
on death row seized on this treaty violation as a potential ground for obtaining
new trials or sentencing hearings. U.S. courts, however, rejected the challenges,
concluding that limitations on federal habeas law trumped the treaty rights that
were now being invoked. Foreign countries then started bringing cases against
the United States in the ICJ—first Paraguay,29 then Germany,30 and finally
Mexico. In the Mexico case, the ICJ held that the United States had breached
the treaty and that it was obligated to provide “review and reconsideration” for
fifty-one Mexican citizens on death row in various states, notwithstanding any
domestic law limitations (such as rules of procedural default) that would
otherwise disallow reopening those cases.31
In the Medellin case, which was brought by one of the Mexican citizens
named in the ICJ decision, the Supreme Court had to decide what effect the
ICJ’s judgment had in the U.S. legal system. There was no dispute that the
judgment was binding on the United States under international law, by virtue of
the UN Charter. But this was a case in which Texas law would ordinarily
disallow the petitioner a new hearing, so the question was whether the treaty
obligation relating to the ICJ decision created domestic law with sufficient

25. U.N. Charter art. 94(1), 59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 993 (1945).
26. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, art. 36, Apr.
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
27. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820.
28. See, e.g., S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas’s Death Row and the
Right of Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 719, 748 (1995) (“Telephone calls by the authors to a
number of major-city police departments indicated little awareness of the Vienna Convention and an
absence of any procedure to inform foreign nationals of their right of consular access.”).
29. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9).
30. See LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
31. See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12,
71–72 (Mar. 31).
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force to override the Texas law.32 Sometimes treaty obligations do have this
domestic effect. Unlike the British system, which requires parliamentary
implementation before treaties have domestic effect, the U.S. Constitution
provides that treaties are the supreme law of the land and that they are binding
on state judges.33 But, from early in its history, the Supreme Court has
distinguished between “self-executing” treaty obligations and “non-selfexecuting” obligations, based on the idea that not all treaties are intended to be,
or are suited to be, directly applied by courts as domestic law.34 In Medellin, a
majority of the Court concluded that the obligation in the UN Charter to
comply with ICJ judgments was non-self-executing.
The Court reasoned that it was unlikely that the President and Senate,
when they agreed to the UN Charter in 1945, thought that they were delegating
to an international court the authority to issue rulings that would be
“immediately and directly binding on state and federal courts pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause.”35 Among other things, the Court noted that the only type
of enforcement specified in the UN Charter for seeking compliance with ICJ
judgments was through the United Nations Security Council (Council), and that
the United States had successfully insisted in the UN Charter on having a veto
authority over Council decisions.36 The Court also noted that in the U.S.
system, even basic constitutional claims are often precluded in a criminal case
after a conviction has become final. It thus saw no reason to think that the
treaty was intended to create the “improbable result of giving the judgments of
an international tribunal a higher status than that enjoyed by ‘many of our most
fundamental constitutional protections.’”37

32. The Court had held in an earlier decision that the Vienna Convention obligation, even if
self-executing, did not itself override such state law limitations. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548
U.S. 331, 355–57 (2006). In reaching this conclusion, the Court disagreed with the ICJ’s contrary
interpretation of the Vienna Convention, while still giving that interpretation “respectful
consideration.” See id. at 355. For additional discussion of that decision, see Curtis A. Bradley, The
Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 59.
33. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (“[A]ll Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
34. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829) (“[W]hen the terms of the [treaty]
stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engage to perform a particular act, the treaty
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.”).
35. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 510 (2008).
36. Id. at 509–10.
37. Id. at 523 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360). For additional discussion of the
implications of Medellin for treaty self-execution, see Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and
Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540 (2008) and Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution
and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 131. For an argument that the decisions and rulings of
international institutions should generally be presumed not to operate as self-executing law in the U.S.
legal system, see Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and NonSelf-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003).
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IV.
DOMESTIC APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The Court’s filtering role in the fourth and final scenario—the domestic
application of customary international law—is illustrated by two Supreme
Court decisions: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, decided in 2004; and Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum, decided in 2013. These decisions involved human
rights suits brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The ATS dates back to
the First Judiciary Act of 1789, and it provides that the federal district courts
shall have jurisdiction over suits by aliens for torts that violate either treaties or
the “law of nations,”38 which was the phrase that historically was used to refer
to customary international law. For almost two hundred years after its
enactment, the ATS was a relatively unknown provision that was almost never
successfully invoked as a basis for jurisdiction. That changed in 1980, when the
Second Circuit ruled in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala that victims of human rights
abuses abroad could use the statute to sue the perpetrators of the abuse when
the perpetrators could be served with process in the United States.39
The circuit judge who authored the opinion in Filártiga observed at the
end of the opinion that the court’s decision represented “a small but important
step in the fulfillment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal
violence.”40 Although this goal is appealing, it is unlikely that it is what
Congress had in mind in 1789 when it enacted the statute. The text, statutory
context, and historical backdrop of the ATS suggest that Congress intended to
provide for federal jurisdiction over certain sensitive tort cases to avoid
unnecessary friction between the United States and other nations that might
arise from leaving the cases to state court adjudication.41 In particular,
Congress was likely concerned about cases in which the United States would
have had an international obligation to provide an avenue for redress, and it
therefore wanted to avoid having compliance with this obligation rest solely on
state courts.42 Most international human rights cases, including Filártiga, do
not implicate this concern, since the United States does not have an obligation
to provide redress for victims of foreign human rights abuses. In fact, allowing
international human rights litigation may actually contradict the original
purpose of the statute, since such litigation often creates friction with other
countries.43
It took the Supreme Court a long time to weigh in on this issue—too long,
probably—since lower courts had been expressing concerns for years that they
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
39. See 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
40. Id. at 890.
41. See BRADLEY, supra note 5, at 202–03.
42. See id. at 203.
43. See John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S.
Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Approaches (Apr. 11, 2008), http://20012009.state.gov/s/l/rls/103506.htm [http://perma.cc/2QYJ-RXTH].
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did not have enough guidance about what they should be doing with these
international cases.44 Eventually, in 2004, the Court in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain attempted to cabin ATS litigation without completely shutting it
down.45 Sosa was an unusual ATS case, in that the allegedly tortious conduct—
the kidnapping of a Mexican doctor in Mexico—was carried out at the behest
of the U.S. government. But the Court also considered the use of the ATS for
international human rights litigation more generally. In his majority opinion,
Justice Souter observed that judicial application of the ATS required “vigilant
doorkeeping.”46 He explained that “[a] series of reasons argue for judicial
caution when considering the kinds of individual claims that might implement
the jurisdiction conferred by the [ATS].”47 Among other things, Justice Souter
suggested that “[s]ince many attempts by federal courts to craft remedies for
the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse
foreign policy consequences, they should be undertaken, if at all, with great
caution.”48 Relatedly, he noted that the Court had “no congressional mandate to
seek out and define new and debatable violations of the law of nations.”49
Applying this cautionary approach, the Court held that violations of modern
norms of customary international law would be actionable under the ATS only
if the norms were widely accepted and specifically defined,50 a test that the
Court found was not met in that case.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia expressed skepticism that general
statements about judicial caution would have much effect on cabining ATS
litigation in our large and decentralized federal court system,51 and it turned out
that he was right. As Justice Breyer states in his book, “[m]any lower courts
seemed to find in Sosa a green light, not a note of caution.”52 Among other
things, by the time the Court decided Sosa, an increasing number of cases were
being brought against multinational corporations for allegedly “aiding and
abetting” human rights violations abroad, and this growth in ATS cases
continued after Sosa.53 Multinational corporations are attractive defendants
because they have no sovereign immunity, they tend to be amenable to service
in the United States, they frequently have deep pockets, and they often have an
44. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (“This case deals with an area of the law that cries out for clarification by the
Supreme Court.”).
45. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
46. Id. at 729.
47. Id. at 725.
48. Id. at 727–28.
49. Id. at 728. For a consideration of the implications of Sosa for the application of customary
international law more generally in the U.S. legal system, see Curtis A. Bradley et al., Sosa,
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869 (2007).
50. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
51. See id. at 747–48 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. BREYER, supra note 1, at 155.
53. See Curtis A. Bradley, State Action and Corporate Human Rights Liability, 85 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1823, 1824–25 (2010).
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incentive to enter into a financial settlement to avoid negative publicity. The
growth in ATS litigation prompted expressions of concern from other
countries, which argued that U.S. courts were overreaching the proper bounds
of their jurisdiction. As a Legal Adviser to the State Department explained, in
this litigation the United States was “regarded as something of a rogue actor”
because it was “perceived . . . as having in effect established an International
Civil Court.”54
The Supreme Court returned to the ATS in 2013, in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum.55 In that case, citizens of Nigeria who were residing in the United
States brought suit against Dutch and British oil companies for allegedly aiding
and abetting human rights abuses by the Nigerian military. In upholding a
dismissal of this suit, the Court in Kiobel held that the ATS, like other federal
statutes, is subject to a presumption against extraterritoriality. That is, unless
and until Congress amends the statute to indicate that it applies abroad, the
presumption is that claims cannot be brought under the statute for conduct that
takes place outside the United States. The ATS presented a somewhat unusual
candidate for the presumption against extraterritoriality, in that it is a
jurisdictional provision that references international law, and international law
is of course not limited in its application to U.S. territory. But the Court
explained that the judicial development by the federal courts of remedies for
violations of this international law, a practice initiated in Filártiga and then
approved with caution in Sosa, involved the application of domestic law
(namely, judicially developed federal common law). This element of domestic
law made it appropriate to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality.56
And the Court said that, if anything, “the danger of unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy [wa]s magnified in the context of
the ATS, because the question [wa]s not what Congress has done but instead
what courts may do.”57
The presumption against extraterritoriality is strong medicine, and in his
concurrence in Kiobel, Justice Breyer expressed the view that its application
there was too strong.58 But it should be noted that the Kiobel decision does not

54. See Bellinger III, supra note 43.
55. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
56. Id. at 1663–64.
57. Id. at 1664.
58. See id. at 1671. In his book, Justice Breyer seems to interpret the majority opinion as still
allowing for claims relating to foreign human rights abuses if the defendant now resides in the United
States. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 161. That was what Justice Breyer had argued in his concurrence
that the majority should have allowed, see 133 S. Ct. at 1671, but it seems doubtful that this is the best
reading of what the majority actually held. While the majority did state, as Justice Breyer notes, that
the presumption against extraterritoriality could be overcome in some situations in which the
plaintiff’s “claims touch and concern the territory of the United States,” id. at 1669, the majority was
specifically referring there to a connection between the plaintiff’s claims and the United States, not
between the defendant’s current residence and the United States. Moreover, the majority made clear
that dismissal of an ATS claim is proper if “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United
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preclude Congress from authorizing broader human rights litigation in U.S.
courts if it so chooses. Instead, the decision simply leaves that important policy
choice to the legislative and executive branches, which, as a matter of
separation of powers, are more appropriately positioned to weigh the foreign
policy trade-offs implicated by this litigation. Congress has specifically
authorized and defined the limits of international human rights claims in other
statutes, most notably in the 1992 Torture Victim Protection Act,59 and it can
do so again if it thinks that ATS litigation should be broader than is allowed
under Kiobel.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Supreme Court plays an important role in mediating between
international law and constitutional values of individual liberty, federalism, and
the separation of powers—a role that is needed in light of the different
processes used to generate international law and domestic law, as well as the
different functions served by these bodies of law. Occasionally, the Court
carries out this role through direct application of the Constitution, as in Reid v.
Covert. Most of the time, however, it does so indirectly—through, for example,
application of the non-self-execution doctrine, as in Medellin; invocation of
presumptions and clear-statement rules, as in Bond and Kiobel; and by tailoring
the domestic application of international law to specific statutory schemes or
political branch practices, as in Sosa. These various filtering techniques have
thus far allowed the Court to avoid having to specify the structural
constitutional limitations on U.S. engagement with international law,
something that is probably for the best, as Justice Breyer observes in his
book.60 This filtering role means that sometimes the international law applied
by the U.S. legal system will differ from the international law applied by an
international tribunal, such as the ICJ, a tribunal that is sometimes colloquially
referred to as the “World Court.” As Justice Breyer reminds us in his book,
however, the U.S. Supreme Court is not, and should not try to be, the World
Court.

States.” Id. (emphasis added). Although the lower courts have differed to some extent in their
interpretation of the “touch and concern” test from Kiobel, no court so far has held that the mere U.S.
residence of a defendant is sufficient to meet that test. Cf. Warfaa v. Ali, 811 F.3d 653, 661 (4th Cir.
2016) (“Mere happenstance of residency, lacking any connection to the relevant conduct, is not a
cognizable consideration in the ATS context.”).
59. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
60. See BREYER, supra note 1, at 234–35.

